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Abstract
Efficiency as quantified and promoted by cost-effectiveness analysis sometimes conflicts with equity and other ethical
values, such as the “rule of rescue” or rights-based ethical values. We describe the utilitarian foundations of
cost-effectiveness analysis and compare it with alternative ethical principles. We find that while fallible, utilitarianism is
usually superior to the alternatives. This is primarily because efficiency – the maximization of health benefits under a
budget constraint – is itself an important ethical value. Other ethical frames may be irrelevant, incompatible with each
other, or have unacceptable implications. When alternatives to efficiency are considered for precedence, we propose
that it is critical to quantify the trade-offs, in particular, the lost health benefits associated with divergence from strict
efficiency criteria. Using an example from HIV prevention in a high-prevalence African country, we show that favoring a
rights-based decision could result in 92–118 added HIV infections per $100,000 of spending, compared to one based
on cost-effectiveness.
Keywords: Ethics, Global health, Cost-effectiveness, Utilitarianism, Health economics
Background
Economic efficiency is a leading criterion for resource
allocation decisions for global (or public) health [1, 2].
Yet assessments of efficiency in the form of cost-effect-
iveness (CEA) or cost-benefit analysis (CBA) are
regarded with a mixture of enthusiasm and suspicion:
enthusiasm, because, all else equal, program managers
and policy makers seek to maximize the benefit from
limited dollars; and suspicion, because all else is rarely
equal, when other considerations are included such as
fairness and reduction in disparities. Indeed, CEAs are
perceived by some as ethically suspect because they rest
on a conceptual foundation that violates everyday moral
intuitions [3]. By representing human life in dollar terms
and choosing among life-saving interventions based on
mathematically-derived return-on-investment metrics,
they undermine the expression of communitarian values,
and often appear to conflict with a range of ethical prin-
ciples including equity, urgent need, and human rights
as enshrined in international law [4, 5].
In this article, we describe the ethical framework im-
plied by CEA, utilitarianism, as applied to global health.
Second, after describing some of the moral objections to
utilitarianism, we show that the criticisms leveled against
CEA on ethical grounds are often misleading: Efficiency
in promoting human life and health is itself a valid
ethical standard, and that alternative formal ethical
approaches, as well as everyday ethical intuitions,
present their own problems when applied to real world
situations. In particular, we discuss the moral equiva-
lence between identified and statistical lives implied by
utilitarianism. Using the example of the female condom
to prevent HIV transmission in developing countries, we
also show that using non-efficiency based principles to
guide resource allocation, even central principles such as
human rights, when applied too narrowly, can inadvert-
ently lead to undermining those very principles. Third,
we argue that while no infallible theory of the ethics of
resource allocation is yet available, the utilitarian frame-
work underlying CEA and CBA generally provides trust-
worthy guidance; is usually superior to the alternatives,
and should therefore constitute the default perspective.
Finally, we propose that when utilitarianism generates
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results that stakeholders deem ethically unacceptable,
the grounds for that dissatisfaction should be made nu-
merically explicit. A good faith effort should be made to
describe and quantify the trade-offs associated with deci-
sions that diverge from efficiency criteria.
Ethical framework implied by cost-effectiveness analysis
The ethical foundation of CEA and CBA, utilitarianism,
was originally developed by the nineteenth century
British philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart
Mills [6, 7] and was recently revisited and advanced
by Peter Singer in “Practical Ethics” and other writ-
ings, and by Joshua Greene in “Moral Tribes” [8, 9].
Utilitarianism is a species of Consequentialism, which
is the ethical doctrine that one should judge actions by
the outcomes that can reasonably be expected to follow,
and not by the actors’ intention or by fidelity to an ab-
stract moral principle. Thus, the overarching maxim of
Utilitarianism is, “Act in such a way as to generate the
maximum quantum of well-being, happiness, or utility”,
or in Bentham’s famous dictum, “the greatest good for
the greatest number” [6]. In the context of global health,
this implies:
1. Resources should be allocated consistent with
maximizing overall benefit, such as deaths averted
or quality-adjusted life-years gained. Such allocation
decisions are consistent with the findings of cost-
effectiveness analyses.
2. All lives have the same value. While anodyne at
first sight, this concept helps fuel utilitarianism’s
reputation for replacing common humanity with
hyper-rational calculation. It means, for example,
that there is no basis for distinguishing between
identified lives (e.g., a sick person treated at a
hospital) versus statistical lives (e.g., unknown
individuals who avoid disease). We argue that in
general, this principle is in fact consistent with
our humanity and is at the heart of the unique
contribution of the global health perspective.
3. No special claim accrues to alleviating inequality.
The exception is when privileging vulnerable
populations, or those with less access to care, is an
efficient means to achieving #1, above. This
seeming indifference to the plight of the poor may
be part of the reason for the “.. . widespread
suspicion that CEA does favor the healthy and
well-to-do” [10]. We will argue that there is less
to object to here than meets the eye: in most
populations, efficiency and inequality alleviation
are concordant. This is because poor people are
usually sicker and start with fewer health resources
than wealthier neighbors.
Few would dispute the notion that #1 is an important
part of rational resource allocation. Our difference with
some critics of CEA is that we believe other ethical
values should onely rarely substantially modify guidance
based on efficiency alone. As expounded below, those
other ethical values are not necessarily of a higher order
than efficiency, and have their own problems.
Regarding #2, powerful, often irresistible emotions, es-
pecially empathy, impel decision makers to privilege
identified lives. Nevertheless, we are aware of no rational
basis for elevating this sense of empathy to a principle
that should guide policy. Public health as distinct from
clinical medicine is, at its core, concerned with popula-
tions, not identified individuals. Statistical lives are in
fact identified lives for the friends and family members
of those persons. The impulse to favor identified individ-
uals is thus a failure of imagination. For public health
professionals to treat identified lives as having a primary
claim because they are less visible to those professionals,
lacks ethical foundation.
Regarding #3, as a practical matter, the area of poten-
tial conflict between equity and utilitarianism is smaller
than one might expect. This is because the incremental
benefit of investing additional global health dollars for
the poor and others with limited access to health care is
generally greater than the incremental benefits generated
by the same dollars spent on the more affluent and those
with better access to health care [2]. Thus, in most cases,
efficiency and equity goals are aligned. For example,
malaria and neglected tropical diseases account for 15%
of the total burden of disease in sub-Saharan Africa [11]
and malaria deaths are closely associated with poverty
[12]. A 2013 systematic review and meta-analysis found a
roughly two-fold higher risk of parasitemia in children of
lower compared with children of higher socio-economic
status [13]. Malaria treatment and prevention is one of the
areas where investment in global health have seen the
greatest returns in the past 20 years. These interventions
are included in the “enhanced investment scenario” for
low-income countries needed to achieve global health
convergence by 2035 [12].
Limitations to criticisms of cost-effectiveness analysis and
problems with other ethical principles
Various ethical principles are cited to justify policy posi-
tions or resource allocation decisions in global health
[5]. Each represents a broadly shared moral intuition.
However, the policy choices implied by these different
principles often conflict. Current public health discourse
makes no reference to a meta-ethic which might lead us
to choose one ethical principle over another, and thus
invites an ad hoc application of decision rules. Policy ac-
tors and advocates often choose whatever ethical principle
aligns with their existing action preferences. Rather than
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ethical argument fulfilling its proper function of constrain-
ing and informing political and ideological predispositions,
the invocation of ethical principles can devolve into justifi-
cation of those predispositions. At their worst, they may
be used to deprecate opponents into silence. For example,
because rights are associated with non-negotiable moral
and legal imperatives, framing a choice in human rights
terms can appear to preclude inquiry and analysis.
A 2012 article by Ruth Macklin and Ethan Cowan out-
lined several ethical principles that could be brought to bear
on the question of how, in developing countries, limited
supplies of antiretroviral drugs should be divided between
HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention via pre-exposure
prophylaxis [14]. The piece concisely describes six ethical
principles: utilitarianism, equity, urgent need, prioritarian-
ism, rule of rescue, and equal worth to which we have
added a seventh, “Rights”.
1. Utilitarianism: Maximize total health benefit given
the relevant budget.
2. Equity: Divide resources to reduce disparities in
health status among different groups or strata, poor,
women, rural areas, ethnic/racial minorities.
3. Urgent need: More urgent needs give rise to
stronger moral claims
4. Prioritarianism: Provide resources to the least
advantaged.
5. Rule of rescue: Identified lives in imminent danger
take precedence.
6. Equal worth: All lives have equal worth; therefore,
all are entitled to the same resources.
7. Rights: Certain freedoms and protections under the
law, or material goods and services are due all
human beings.
The authors then discuss the difficulties in interpreting
each of these in the context of this HIV/AIDS-related
policy decision. For example, if one were to adopt the
principle of “urgent need” it is unclear whose needs
(those benefiting from treatment versus from preven-
tion) should be considered most urgent. Similarly, it is
hard to know what is “equitable” since we have no guid-
ance for choosing equal inputs over equal health effects,
or vice versa. Furthermore, does “equity” mean equality,
or does it refer to justice based on another unstated cri-
terion? Likewise, too much weight applied to the rule of
rescue would quickly exhaust available funds, and thus
seriously undermine the ability to build sustainable
health systems, and thus progress towards the utilitarian
goal of maximizing health, or right-based access to
health care. Similar questions and objections apply to
each of the principles outlined. It is worth noting that
no mention is made by Macklin and Cowan of human
rights. But the practical meaning of “rights” in this
context would also be difficult to interpret. Does the
right to treatment supersede the right to prevention? If
so, why? If there is an ethical imperative to provide both
adequate treatment and prevention, we’ve assumed away
the trade-off, which is at the heart of this and of all re-
source allocation decisions See Fig. 1.
The figure above shows in rough, qualitative fashion
how well these principles coincide in the case of the
allocation of antiretroviral medications for HIV preven-
tion via Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) versus HIV
treatment. These principles have different possible prac-
tical interpretations, particularly Equity, Urgent Need,
and Prioritarianism. While the article offers a clear state-
ment of the problem (i.e., the difficulty in choosing
among ethical theories and in understanding how each
should be interpreted in the context of a specific pro-
gram choice), the arguments advanced for the selected
option are unconvincing. The authors, citing Macklin’s
own earlier work write,
“When principles conflict, it becomes necessary to
balance competing concerns. There is no correct way of
achieving this balance. Moreover, there is no consensus
on how the different principles ought to be weighted,
or on what weight should be given to the goal of
maximizing health compared to other social goods
such as education or environmental protection.”
This problem has also been identified by other analysts
such as Johri and Norheim in their systematic review of ef-
forts to integrate concerns for equity with cost-effectiveness
analysis [15]. They point out that, “A central problem re-
lates to the fact that equity is understood in multiple ways,
each demarcating a distinct set of intuitions concerning
fairness. Each method takes a distinct approach to how
values should articulate with cost-effectiveness evidence.”
Macklin and Cowan advocate for balancing the influ-
ence of multiple principles. Akin to advancing an unfalsifi-
able hypothesis, the appeal to weighing moral desiderata
based on unspecified criteria makes it hard to know under
what circumstances a choice can be said to be ethically in-
correct. Later we find, “The ultimate goal, of course, is to
achieve a utilitarian outcome tempered by considerations
of equity and urgent need.” Why “of course”? If this con-
clusion flows naturally from ordinary moral intuitions,
why attempt to identify and apply general principles? The
proposed conclusion is only a re-statement of the original
problem, begging the question, “In what proportions
should these principles be mixed, and what principle
would guide us to the optimal proportions?” The conclu-
sion advocated in the article, namely that treatment has a
prior claim over prevention in the allocation of antiretro-
viral drugs for HIV/AIDS, is simply asserted based on an
opaque weighting of competing ethical principles. The
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unstated meta-ethical principle is that a result that highly
over-weights any one principle is likely to be unethical.
But why should that be? Why is it not just as plausible
that one principle should dominate? Since this question is
not addressed, we are left with the ad hoc mix of ethical
appeals that policy makers now use. In the absence of
guidance on how to weight the multiple ethical principles
described, decisions based on historical and cultural
norms, politics and ideology can be dressed in whatever
ethical clothing seems to fit. This is a description of the
world we now inhabit. It is unclear how “balancing” mul-
tiple competing ethical principles puts health resource
allocation on a more reliable ethical foundation.
A set of thought experiments dubbed the “Trolley Prob-
lem” was advanced by the British philosopher Philippa
Foot at Oxford University in 1967 and later elaborated by
Judith Thomson at MIT and others [16–19]. The trolley
problems demonstrate vividly that different respondents
consider different circumstances to be morally relevant.
More tellingly, the same respondent may find acceptable a
principle such as “one must take no action that results in
the death of an innocent” in one set of circumstances, only
to be repulsed by the consequences of applying such a
principle under slightly altered circumstances.1 If contem-
plation of “Trolleyology” reduces one’s confidence in
everyday ethical judgments, Joshua Greene, in Moral
Tribes, [9] and Randall Moore in his 1996 article, Caring
for Identified Versus Statistical Lives: An Evolutionary
View of Medical Distributive Justice [20] advance the idea
that far from being a direct line to sound ethical under-
standing, ordinary ethical intuitions are a function of evo-
lutionary pressures of the ancient savannah, especially the
need to interact successfully with small numbers of fellow
tribe members.
Humans, including scientists trained in statistics, also
handle small numbers much better than large
numbers (Tversky and Kahneman 1971). This is
consistent with our evolutionary need to deal with
small numbers of people and objects and not with
large numbers. Throughout the great majority of
human history, an ability to easily understand and
manipulate large numbers would have been wasted
and wasteful. We would expect that evolution did not
emphasize cognitive abilities that would be little used,
because such an emphasis would waste neurological
energy that could be spent on more practical tasks [20].
The theory that different types of cognitive processes
are used to make judgments about specific as opposed
to general objects is supported by a number of psycho-
logical theories, [21, 22] and dual-process models [23, 24].
A discussion of the state of the neuroscience relevant to
these claims is beyond the scope of this article. However,
on this account, the general tendency to accord preferen-
tial treatment to identified lives [25, 26] may be a function
of the evolution of “moral brains” molded by the survival
advantage conferred by forming strong affiliations and re-
ciprocal loyalties, not on recognizable principles of justice.
The single most common objection to utilitarianism is
that it seems to permit using human beings as a means
to an end, thus violating the rights of those people [9].
John Rawls, in particular, criticized utilitarianism on
these grounds [27]. For example, if it could be shown
that the unhappiness of slaves was outweighed by the
happiness of slave owners, would slavery therefore be
morally justified? This is the kind of counter-intuitive,
and indeed, repugnant outcome that utilitarian rational-
ity sometimes appears to imply. On the other hand, utili-
tarianism can also seem to place demands on moral
actors that appear too stringent. The logical terminus of
Peter Singer’s famous thought experiment regarding
what we should be willing to give up to save a drowning
child, is that we should be willing to impoverish
Fig. 1 Likelihood of convergence between ethical principles
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ourselves in order to save the lives of the poor and sick
in less developed countries [28]. These and other argu-
ments against utilitarianism and replies to these objections
are summarized in Moral Tribes. For example, according
to Greene, slavery is actually not permitted on the utilitar-
ian account because, as a practical matter, it is implausible
that slavery could increase net utility, though it might
increase wealth.
Arguments for utilitarianism as the default ethical
perspective
The possibility of repugnant outcomes is by no means
unique to utilitarianism. As shown in the Trolley Problem,
and in evaluating the ethical implications of favoring
expenditures on antiretroviral drugs for treatment over
pre-exposure prophylaxis, non-efficiency based principles
are often hard to interpret, irrelevant, or contradictory.
They may also lead to outcomes that diverge dramatically
from that of health-maximization. Cost-effectiveness ana-
lysis has the virtue of being relevant to any resource allo-
cation decision. Its operational definition is unambiguous
(maximization of health benefits for a given budget) even
if performing cost-effectiveness calculations is sometimes
challenging.
Other principles, such as rule of rescue or the urgent
need based adjudications of claims on health care re-
sources, have expression in clinical medicine and elsewhere.
However, the principles appropriate when considering the
welfare of large populations differs from those appropriate
for clinical medicine or for small communities and families.
Utilitarianism, because it does not distinguish between
identified and statistical lives is, in general, the framework
best suited to the former.
We do not propose that utilitarianism is the only legit-
imate guide to global health resource allocation decisions.
However, we do suggest that it should be the point of
departure for further analysis. Because of its intrinsic
ethical dimensions, efficiency is not merely one criterion
among many. The promotion of human flourishing is a
central goal of most ethical system. Attaining the greatest
population health available with given resources is con-
sonant with that flourishing. Thus, decisions to diverge
from pursuit of that goal to promote other ethical values
should be acknowledged and justified.
Wherever possible, decision-makers should quantify
the tradeoff, i.e. the loss of health resulting from pursuit
of other ethical values. This will often be possible in a
rough but serviceable manner. For example, spending
incremental dollars on the male condom will almost
always generate greater health benefit than spending the
same money on female condoms [29]. The details of
why this is true in almost every HIV epidemic type and
risk sub-population are complex, but this finding was
driven primarily by two factors: a) the female condom is
much more expensive than the male condom while con-
ferring the same protective benefit per unprotected sex
episode; and b) use of a female condom often displaces
use of a male condom, thus providing no additional pro-
tection. However, one of the virtues of the female condom
according to proponents, is that it enhances women’s au-
tonomy in negotiating the terms of sexual relations, and
thus contributes to the empowerment and rights of
women [30, 31]. Though potentially significant, the degree
to which access to the female condom helps secure this
right to autonomy is hard to quantify. Rather than either
ignoring right-based imperatives on the one hand, or
insisting that these values trump “mere” efficiency con-
cerns on the other hand, we performed an analysis which
solved for the value that would need to be placed on the
incremental empowerment of women, such that invest-
ments in the female condom over the male condom
would be justified. Table 1 illustrates the health conse-
quences of promoting the female condom over the male
condom in high-prevalence HIV countries. The figures are
the results of a cost-effectiveness model that assumes the
full costs of $0.13 for the male condom and $1.00 for the
female condom. This is a low estimate of the cost of the
female condom and the results displayed are therefore
likely tilted in favor of the female condom. The model
incorporates information on HIV transmission risk per
episode; protective benefits of both types of condoms;
sexual behavioral data on three sub-populations, sex
workers, women with regular partners and women with
casual partners; rates of substitution between male and
female condoms; and other parameters affecting the cost
of generating an incremental protected sexual episode.
The key finding is that for every $100,000 spent on
condoms in an African country with high HIV preva-
lence, between 92 and 118 additional cases of HIV could
be averted by investing in the male condom rather than
the female condom. If one believes in the power of the
female condom to enhance women’s rights, one might
want to argue that this is a price worth paying. It would
be an example of what Johri terms “the opportunity cost
of equity” [15]. However, in the context of the female
condom it seems a difficult case to make, particularly if
one is concerned about the rights and health, of those
Table 1 Comparison of the effect of spending 100,000 on the
female condom versus spending 100,000 on the male condom
in three HIV risk groups in high-prevalence countries
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92–118 additionally infected people, many of whom will
be women. Article 25 of the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights guarantees access to ad-
equate medical care for all persons [32]. Similar lan-
guage exists in Articles 12 and14 of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, and Article 12 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [33, 34]. These
legal and moral principles are not superseded by utilitar-
ian values. But the full realization of these rights-based
values will, for the foreseeable future be imperfect given
health care budgets and other constraints. Therefore,
efficiency concerns as expressed in utilitarianism and
cost-effectiveness analysis will often be the best guide to
rapidly securing those rights for as many people as
possible. However, this can only be accomplished when
decision makers acknowledge that the trade-offs of the
type illustrated in the female condom example are real
and consequential.
When competing ethical principles favor different
actions, following non-efficiency based principles may
increase mortality or morbidity. It is true that a small
fraction of what the world spends on armaments and on
ultra-luxurious or frivolous pursuits could, if re-deployed,
have huge global health benefits. But this information is of
no use to the Minister of Health in a low-income country
as she decides what portion of her budget should be allo-
cated to TB drugs, versus bed nets to control malaria.
Conclusions
The long-term social and political project of re-directing
resources away from activities that undermine human
flourishing and toward those that are conducive, is one
of the most urgent of our era. However, for any mean-
ingful time horizon there will be insufficient money to
pursue all beneficial activities. Trade-offs, and the prob-
lems of resource allocation will therefore persist. Utili-
tarianism will usually be the most reliable guide in
resolving those trade-offs.
Endnotes
1Once the domain of philosophers and ethicists, “Trol-
leyology” is now widely discussed in the popular press.
This may be in part because the types of fanciful situa-
tions concocted in the original trolley problems are now
similar to actual dilemmas that must be addressed by
those writing the software governing autonomous
vehicles.
Abbreviations
CBA: Cost-benefit analysis; CEA: Cost-effectiveness analysis; HIV: Human
Immunodeficiency Virus; PrEP: Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis
Acknowledgements
None.
Funding
Neither author received any institutional or other funding for this project. It
was entirely ‘extracurricular’.
Availability of data and materials
Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or
analyzed during the current study.
Authors’ contributions
EAM conceived and drafted the paper. JGK contributed to the concept,
edited the paper and provided a number of illustrations and examples. Both
authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Authors’ information
EAM is principal of the firm, Health Strategies International, that specializes in
the economic evaluation of both global and domestic public health
programs. Trained in health policy analysis, Dr. Marseille has over 30 years of
senior public health management and research experience with a focus on
the empirical and modeled assessment of the cost and cost-effectiveness of
programs, and policies related to HIV/AIDS and other diseases relevant to
global health. JGK is Emeritus Professor at the Philip R. Lee Institute for Health
Policy Studies, the Institute for Global Health Sciences, and the Department of
Epidemiology and Biostatistics, all at UCSF. Dr. Kahn is an expert in cost-
effectiveness analysis, evidence-based medicine, and policy modeling in health
care. His work focuses on the use of cost-effectiveness analysis to inform
decision-making in public health and medicine. He is a widely published
expert in the economic assessment of HIV prevention and treatment
programs and on a wide range of other global health issues.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not relevant. No human or animal subjects were needed or used.
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Author details
1Health Strategies International, Oakland, CA, USA. 2Philip R. Lee Institute for
Health Policy Studies, University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA.
Received: 2 July 2018 Accepted: 15 March 2019
References
1. Jamison DT. Disease control priorities, 3rd edition: improving health and
reducing poverty. Lancet. 2018;391(10125):e11-e4.
2. Musgrove P. Public spending on health care: how are different criteria
related? Health Policy. 1999;47(3):207–23.
3. Neumann PJ, Weinstein MC. Legislating against use of cost-effectiveness
information. N Engl J Med. 2010;363(16):1495–7.
4. Rutstein SE, Price JT, Rosenberg NE, Rennie SM, Biddle AK, Miller WC. Hidden
costs: the ethics of cost-effectiveness analyses for health interventions in
resource-limited settings. Glob Public Health. 2017;12(10):1269–81.
5. Roberts MJ, Reich MR. Ethical analysis in public health. Lancet. 2002;
359(9311):1055–9.
6. Bentham J. An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. A
new ed. London: Printed for W. Pickering etc; 1823.
7. Mill JS. Utilitarianism. London,: Parker, son, and Bourn; 1863. 2 p.l., 95 p. p.
8. Singer P. Practical ethics, vol. xiii. 3rd ed. New York: Cambridge University
Press; 2011. p. 337.
9. Greene J. Moral tribes: emotion, reason, and the gap between us and them:
penguin press; 2013.
10. Russell LB. Is cost-effectiveness analysis unfair? Medical decision making : an
international journal of the Society for Medical Decision Making. 2004;24(2):
232–4.
Marseille and Kahn Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine            (2019) 14:5 Page 6 of 7
11. Evaluation IfHMa. The Global Burden of Disease: Generating Evidence,
Guiding Policy.: IHME; 2013. p. 28.
12. Jamison DT, Summers LH, Alleyne G, Arrow KJ, Berkley S, Binagwaho A, et
al. Global health 2035: a world converging within a generation. Lancet.
2013;382(9908):1898–955.
13. Tusting LS, Willey B, Lucas H, Thompson J, Kafy HT, Smith R, et al.
Socioeconomic development as an intervention against malaria: a
systematic review and meta-analysis. Lancet. 2013;382(9896):963–72.
14. Macklin R, Cowan E. Given financial constraints, it would be unethical to
divert antiretroviral drugs from treatment to prevention. Health Aff.
2012;31(7):1537–44.
15. Johri M, Norheim OF. Can cost-effectiveness analysis integrate concerns for
equity? Systematic review. Int J Technol Assess Health Care. 2012;28(2):125–32.
16. Foot P. The problem of abortion and negative and positive duty: a reply to
James LeRoy Smith. J Med Philos. 1978;3(3):253–5.
17. Thomson JJ. Killing, letting die, and the trolley problem. Monist.
1976;59:204–17.
18. Unger PK. Living high and letting die: our illusion of innocence. New York:
Oxford University Press; 1996. p. xii, 187 p.
19. Costa MJ. ANOTHER TRIP ON THE TROLLEY. South J Philos. 1987;25(4):461–6.
20. Moore RD. Caring for identified versus statistical lives: an evolutionary view
of medical distributive justice. Ethol Sociobiol. 1996;17:379–401.
21. Sherman SJ, Denise R. Beike, Ryalls. KR. Dual-processing accounts of
inconsistencies in responses to General versus specific cases. In: trope SCaY,
editor. Theories in Social psychology. Ndew York: The Guilford Press; 1999.
22. Hamilton DL, Sherman SJ. Perceiving persons and groups. Psychol Rev.
1996;103(2):336–55.
23. Chaiken S. Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use
of source versus message cues in persuasion. J Pers Soc Psychol. 1980;39(3):
752–66.
24. Petty RE, Cacciopo JT. Communication and persuasion. Central and
Perpipheral routes to attitude change. New York: Springer-Verlag; 1986.
25. Small DA, Loewenstein G. Helping a victim or helping the victim: altruism
and identifiability. J Risk Uncertain. 2003;26(1):5–16.
26. Small DA, Loewenstein G. The devil you know: the effects of identifiability
on punishment. J Behav Decis Mak. 2005;18(5):311–8.
27. Rawls J. A theory of justice, vol. xv. Original ed. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap
Press; 2005. p. 607.
28. Singer P. The drowning child and the expanding circle. New
Internationalist. 1997.
29. Social Impact Advisors FSG. Smarter programming of the female condom:
increasing its Impact on HIV prevention in the developing world Boston; 2008.
30. United Nations Population Fund. HIV prevention gains momentum:
successes in female condom programming. New York City: UNFPA; 2011.
31. Gollub EL. The female condom: tool for women's empowerment. Am J
Public Health. 2000;90(9):1377–81.
32. Assembly UG. Universal declaration of human rights (217 [III] a). Paris 1948.
33. UN General Assembly. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women. 1979.
34. UN General Assembly ID. International covenant on economic, Social and
cultural rights. 1969.
Marseille and Kahn Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine            (2019) 14:5 Page 7 of 7
